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ABSTRACT
This paper explores the concept of meaningful remedies for individual
and classes of litigants in lawsuits against the Crown. Using two case
studies, this paper discusses how litigants can ensure that remedies
obtained against the Crown promote accountability and enforceability,
behaviour change and systemic change. These case studies
include Kanthasamy v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), which
considered the scope of humanitarian & compassionate considerations
for children seeking refugee protection in Canada, and First Nations
Child and Family Caring Society v Canada (Attorney General), which
addressed the implementation of Jordan’s Principle for First Nations
children. The author uses these case studies to analyze the challenges
of implementing meaningful remedies in practice and concludes with
three key observations of how Crown executive actors tend to
respond to remedies ordered by courts and administrative tribunals:
(1) they are largely distrusting of remedies ordered by administrative
tribunals; (2) they are largely motivated by political opportunism; and
(3) they often opt to introduce systemic changes through soft law
rather than legally binding measures.
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“Justice includes meaningful remedies.”1

I. INTRODUCTION
In the 2018 decision First Nations Child and Family Caring Society v Canada
(Attorney General), the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal (CHRT) used the above
statement to reinforce the importance of the Government of Canada complying
with the short- and long-term human rights remedies awarded to First Nations
children for the wilful underfunding of on-reserve child welfare services.2 The
Tribunal ordered numerous policy changes to address systemic discrimination
and $40,000 in compensation (the Tribunal maximum) for each of the estimated
54,000 First Nations children and parents impacted by the proceeding—totaling
two billion dollars.3 While the Government of Canada has introduced a First
Nations Child and Family Services Compensation Process, there have been
significant barriers to the implementation and enforcement of this compensation
scheme to date.4 The Latin legal maxim ubi jus, ibi remedium provides that there is
no right without a remedy in law.5 However, the maxim provides no guarantee
that a remedy will be meaningful, effective, or enforceable. Cases such as First
Nations Child and Family Caring Society illustrate that while remedies may be
available in public law litigation, it is their implementation and enforcement that
can prove to be exceptionally challenging for courts, tribunals, and litigants.

First Nations Child and Family Caring Society v Canada (Attorney General), 2018 CHRT 4 at
para 387 [2018 FNCFCS Decision].
2 Ibid.
3 Mia Rabson, “First Nations given max compensation for Ottawa’s child-welfare
discrimination” The National Post (6 September 2019), online:
<nationalpost.com/pmn/news-pmn/canada-news-pmn/first-nations-given-maximumcompensation-for-ottawas-child-welfare-discrimination>.
4 For recent examples of these challenges, see First Nations Child and Family Caring Society
v Canada (Attorney General), 2019 CHRT 39 [2019 FNCFCS Decision] and First Nations
Child and Family Caring Society v Canada (Attorney General), 2020 CHRT 7 [2020 FNCFCS
Decision]. See also Government of Canada, “First Nations Child Services
Compensation Process”, online: <www.fnchildcompensation.ca>.
5 Doucet-Boudreau v Nova Scotia (Minister of Education), 2003 SCC 62 at para 25 [DoucetBoudreau].
1
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Meaningful remedies in public law litigation look very different when
compared to disputes between private parties. Public law issues often affect the
interests of many people— who may constitute a class—with the judge’s
“continuing involvement in [the] administration and implementation” of
complex remedies that often intersect with the government’s policy-making
function.6 One of the most important distinguishing features of public law
litigation is the potential for remedies to modify future behaviour rather than
provide redress for previous wrongs.7 These future-oriented remedies can be
individual or systemic in nature, and often function as a tool “to bring about the
reversal of entrenched patterns of discrimination and inequality that are the
product of institutional, societal and governmental structures and inertia.”8
Evaluating whether these types of remedies are meaningful rests on an
important philosophical distinction: whether our conception of law is
instrumentalist (intended to influence human behaviour or improve societal
conditions) or non-instrumentalist (intended to realize principles and values of
justice).9 In this paper I focus on instrumentalism, recognizing that creating
lasting change at both an individual and systemic level is one of the more practical
functions of our justice system, rather than merely providing corrective justice or
compensatory relief to parties that have been wronged.10
I consider the role of remedies in public law litigation that focuses on
executive action, drawing on jurisprudence and secondary sources in law,
sociolegal studies, political science, and public administration. Meaningful
remedies in the Crown’s exercise of legislative power have been discussed in

Abram Chayes, “The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation” (1976) 89:7 Harv L
Rev 1281 at 1281, 1284.
7 Ibid at 1298.
8 Gwen Brodsky, Shelagh Day & Frances Kelly, “The Authority of Human Rights
Tribunals to Grant Systemic Remedies” (2017) 6:1 Can J Hum Rts 3 at 4.
9 Peter Cane, “Understanding Judicial Review and Its Impact” in Marc Hertogh and
Simon Halliday, eds, Judicial Review and Bureaucratic Impact: International and Interdisciplinary
Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) 15 at 16.
10 Stephen M Johnson, "From Climate Change and Hurricanes to Ecological Nuisances:
Common Law Remedies for Public Law Failures" (2011) 27:3 Ga St U L Rev 565 at
572.
6
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detail, particularly in the context of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.11 However,
few Canadian legal scholars have focused on how courts provide remedies in the
Crown’s exercise of executive power, and it remains a widely misunderstood area
in Canadian public and administrative law. I use case studies as a methodology to
explore this issue further, appreciating that a meaningful discussion about
remedies requires depth and context. In this paper, I discuss executive action in
both its political and administrative context, referring to public officials and
institutions (e.g., the Prime Minister of Canada, members of Cabinet and their
senior ministerial staff, administrative tribunals appointed by Cabinet) that
oversee the implementation and enforcement of laws.12 In some circumstances,
such as the First Nations Child and Family Caring Society case study, courts are asked
to oversee how administrative tribunals, exercising an executive function, succeed
or fail in holding other executive actors accountable. Depending on the nature of
the legal claim, a variety of remedies can be available, including monetary
damages, injunctive relief, or prerogative writ remedies upon judicial review.
In this paper, I make three key observations about how executive actors
responded to tribunal or court-ordered remedies in two case studies: (1) they are
largely distrusting of remedies ordered by administrative tribunals; (2) they are
often motivated by political opportunism; and (3) they often opt to introduce
systemic changes through soft law rather than legally binding measures. After
exploring the importance of remedies for executive action in Part II, I develop
an analytical framework to consider whether a remedy is meaningful in the
context of executive action in Part III. This analytical framework draws on law
professors Peter Cane and Maurice Sunkin’s research to articulate three key
indicia: accountability and enforceability, behaviour change (both individual and
institutional), and systemic change. In Part IV, I apply this analytical framework
to discuss two case studies of litigation against the federal Crown for executive
action: the 2015 Supreme Court of Canada decision Kanthasamy v Canada
(Citizenship & Immigration)13 and the series of Canadian Human Rights Tribunal
See Kent Roach, Constitutional remedies in Canada, 2nd ed (Toronto: Thomson Reuters
Canada, 2019) (loose-leaf edition updated 2019, release 34).
12 Craig Forcese et al, eds, Public Law: Cases, Commentary and Analysis (Toronto: Emond
Montgomery Publications, 2015) at 297.
13 2015 SCC 61 [Kanthasamy].
11
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decisions from 2011–2021 in First Nations Child and Family Caring Society v Canada
(Attorney General).14 I use these case studies to illustrate how executive actors can
respond differently to tribunal or court-ordered remedies to address a similar
issue (the welfare of marginalized or disadvantaged children).

II. WHY DO MEANINGFUL REMEDIES FOR EXECUTIVE
ACTION MATTER?
Meaningful judicial remedies for executive action are critical to maintain the
integrity of the rule of law. In Canada, political executive actors (e.g., the Prime
Minister and Cabinet) can have “significant control over the legislative agenda” 15
when they exercise their statutory or prerogative powers to implement or enforce
laws. When administrative executive actors such as public officials or
administrative decision-making bodies perform governmental functions, they
often exercise significant discretion when interpreting and applying legislative or
judicial direction on a particular legal or policy issue. Cases such as Roncarelli v
Duplessis have demonstrated the consequences of arbitrary exercises of executive
power and the role of judicial remedies in preventing “absolute and untrammeled
‘discretion’”16 from undermining the rule of law and eroding public trust in
government institutions and officials. Despite the broad scope of authority and
discretion afforded to executive actors, courts are often reluctant to impose
substantive remedies for fear of disrupting the separation of powers doctrine.17
However, in a rising tide of populism and mistrust in judicial decisionmaking, it is increasingly important that judicial remedies serve as an effective

See First Nations Child and Family Caring Society of Canada et al v Canada (Attorney General),
2016 CHRT 2 [2016 FNCFCS Decision]; 2018 FNCFCS Decision, supra note 1 and
2019 FNCFCS Decision, supra note 4.
15 Forcese et al, supra note 12 at 299.
16 [1959] SCR 121 at 140.
17 This is particularly true when exercises of Crown prerogative power are in question.
See Philippe Lagasse, “Parliamentary and judicial ambivalence towards executive
prerogative powers” (2012) 55:2 Canadian Public Administration 157 at 159.
14
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safeguard against illegal or arbitrary exercises of executive power.18 The
relationship between the executive branches at both the provincial and federal
level—and their respective relationships with courts—has become increasingly
adversarial, with more political leaders demonstrating an increased willingness to
engage the notwithstanding clause if their decisions face a Charter challenge.19
While some may argue that this type of adversarialism between executive actors
and courts is “dialogue theory” in action, it risks conflicting with the first principle
of the rule of law articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada—that the law is
supreme over both private individuals and government officials, the latter of
whom must exercise their authority in a non-arbitrary way.20
Courts also have an important role in ensuring executive actors respond
“promptly and in good faith” to judicial remedies, even if those remedies are not
consistent with the executive’s political interests.21 There are numerous examples
of Canadian cases that resulted in overt executive inaction in response to judicial
remedies.22 In Canada (Prime Minister) v Khadr, the Supreme Court of Canada
declared that Canada contributed to Mr. Khadr’s ongoing detention, depriving
him of his right to liberty and security of person under section 7 of the Charter.23
While the Court hesitated to exercise further remedial discretion due to the nature
of the prerogative powers exercised, the Crown decided not to remedy the Charter
breach because they had “no political motive to do anything that might benefit,
or even appear to benefit, Omar Khadr.”24 However, cases such as Canada
Kent Roach, “Dialogue in Canada and the Dangers of Simplified Comparative Law
and Populism” in Geoffrey Sigalet, Gregoire Webber & Rosalind Dixon, eds,
Constitutional dialogue: rights, democracy, institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2019) 267 at 307 [Roach, “Dialogue in Canada”].
19 Ibid at 294. Recent examples of adversarialism include Quebec’s use of the
notwithstanding clause to pass Bill 21 (which restricts public servants from wearing
religious symbols in the workplace) and Ontario’s threatened use of the notwithstanding
clause to defend their decision to reduce the size of Toronto City Council.
20 Reference re Language Rights Under s 23 of Manitoba Act, 1870 and s 133 of Constitution Act,
1867, [1985] 1 SCR 721 at para 59 [Manitoba Language Rights Reference].
21 Roach, “Dialogue in Canada” supra note 18 at 304.
22 See Canada (Prime Minister) v Khadr, 2010 SCC 3 [Khadr]; Little Sisters v Canada, [2007] 2
SCR 28.
23 Khadr, supra note 22 at para 48.
24 Audrey Macklin, “Comment on Canada (Prime Minister) v Khadr (2010)” (2010) 51
SCLR 295 at 327; see also Roach, “Dialogue in Canada” supra note 18 at 305.
18
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(Attorney General) v PHS Community Services Society do demonstrate that very explicit
judicial remedies, such as the order of mandamus to exempt the safe-injection
facility Insite from the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, can facilitate an
expedient government response despite political or ideological opposition.25
When courts can impose meaningful judicial remedies for executive action—and
ensure that those remedies are acted upon—the integrity of the rule of law can
be preserved effectively.

III. INDICIA OF MEANINGFUL REMEDIES FOR
EXECUTIVE ACTION
In public law litigation, the dispute is often a grievance about “the operation
of public policy”26 rather than a private transaction or relationship. As a result,
courts must apply different considerations to ensure that a remedy for executive
action provides meaningful redress for affected individuals and the general public.
In the absence of a clear analytical framework, Canadian courts have often
considered remedies in an ad hoc, context-specific manner, without the benefit
of explicit indicia to provide clarity and predictability in such a complex area of
administrative law. As a starting point, Cane has proposed two potential indicia
of meaningful remedies: (a) whether the remedy can be used to hold public bodies
accountable and enforce compliance; and (b) whether the remedy can effectively
change bureaucratic behaviour at a systemic level.27 However, Cane’s indicia fail
2011 SCC 44; Kirk Makin, Sunny Dhillon and Ingrid Peritz, “Supreme Court ruling
opens doors to drug injection clinics across Canada”, Globe and Mail (2011), online:
<www.theglobeandmail.com/news/british-columbia/supreme-court-ruling-opensdoors-to-drug-injection-clinics-across-canada/article4182250>.
26 Chayes, supra note 6 at 1302.
27 Peter Cane, “Administrative Law as Regulation” in Christine Parker, Colin Scott,
Nicola Lacey and John Braithwaite, eds, Regulating Law (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2004) 207 at 221. Cane’s discussion of behaviour change focuses on the
procedural dimensions of public decision-making (e.g., whether decisions were made
fairly, openly, and transparently and whether bureaucratic discretion is appropriately
exercised), noting that many empirical researchers have failed to establish a causal
connection between judicial review remedies and changes in bureaucratic behaviour.
For the purposes of this paper, I distinguish between procedural fairness and behaviour
modification in public officials.
25
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to explore whether public law remedies may, in certain circumstances, have an
important role in influencing the “frameworks, structures and system design” that
inform executive action—what I describe as “systemic change”.28 Systemic
change is about how remedies improve future exercises of executive power. In
this section, I incorporate Sunkin’s concept of systemic change with Cane’s
framework to develop three key indicia of meaningful remedies for executive
action: (1) accountability and enforceability; (2) behaviour change (both individual
and institutional); and (3) systemic change. These indicia are complementary and
mutually reinforcing, rather than mutually exclusive: remedies that hold executive
actors accountable can be a tool to prompt longer-term behaviour and systemic
change and enforcement mechanisms may be required to facilitate this process.
In many cases, changing individual and institutional behaviour is integral to
achieve broader systemic change.
These indicia should not be interpreted as a definitive or closed list. They
are intended to provide a framework to explore the potential and scope of
remedial discretion for exercises of executive power within the bounds of judicial
legitimacy. In some cases, awarding monetary damages or remitting a decision
back to an administrative tribunal for re-hearing may be sufficient to rectify the
wrongdoing and systemic changes may not be required. In other cases, a
meaningful remedy may be one that facilitates expedient action from public
officials due to the time sensitivity of the matter (e.g., refugee protection claims
or habeas corpus applications). However, much of the public law litigation that
focuses on executive action exposes broader systemic issues about how public
power is “allocated, exercised and controlled.”29 As a result, courts may be
required to identify remedies for executive action that are more systemic in nature
to address the power imbalance between citizens and the state.

Maurice Sunkin, “Conceptual Issues in Researching the Impact of Judicial Review on
Government Bureaucracies” in Marc Hertogh and Simon Halliday, eds, Judicial Review
and Bureaucratic Impact: International and Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2004) 43 at 60.
29 Peter Cane, “Executive Primacy, Populism and Public Law” (2019) 28:2 Pac Rim L &
Pol’y J 527 at 527.
28
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Accountability and Enforceability

Meaningful judicial remedies serve to uphold the rule of law and prevent
abuses of power. This is done by providing a measure of accountability and
enforceability in dispute resolution that is otherwise unavailable through political
processes.30 On its own, political constitutionalism provides “imperfect
accountability” because governments can exercise their political power to
advantage or disadvantage particular groups, provided that those policy choices
align with the majority of their electorate.31 In contrast, judicial remedies can
provide accountability by focusing the court’s attention on a set of particular
circumstances, applying a process of principled reasoning based on pre-existing
standards and providing an established level of competence in rule interpretation
and procedural fairness.32 Moreover, the public nature of judicial decisionmaking—with the opportunity to hear from all affected parties and third party
interveners—provides an important formal exercise of accountability.33 Courts
and tribunals also have a duty to give reasons, providing a transparent public
record of whether the Crown’s action in dispute fell within the bounds of its legal
authority.
Depending on the nature of the dispute and the scope of the adjudicator’s
jurisdiction, supervisory orders can be used in Canada as a remedial tool to hold
executive actors accountable.34 While administrative tribunals “have stronger
theoretical justifications for remaining seized of a case over a longer period of
time” 35 due to the nature of their polycentric decision-making, courts can also
act in a supervisory capacity to ensure that a remedy is granted. In the Manitoba
Jeff King, Judging Social Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) at 60.
Forcese et al, supra note 12 at 12.
32 King, supra note 30 at 60-61.
33 Ibid at 61-62.
34 Some legal scholars have argued that suspended declarations of invalidity are more
consistent with the separation of powers doctrine (see Janet E Minor & James S F
Wilson, “Reflections of a Supervisory Order Sceptic: Ten Years after Doucet-Boudreau” in
Robert J Sharpe & Kent Roach, eds, Taking Remedies Seriously (Ottawa: Canadian
Institute for the Administration of Justice, 2009) 303 at 303.
35 Cristie Ford, “Remedies in Canadian Administrative Law: A Roadmap to a Parallel
Legal Universe” in Colleen M Flood & Lorne Sossin, eds, Administrative Law in Context,
3rd ed (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications, 2018) 43 at 49.
30
31
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Language Rights Reference, the Supreme Court of Canada ordered special hearings
to be arranged at the request of the Attorneys General of Canada or Manitoba to
monitor the translation, re-enactment, printing, and publishing of Manitoban
statutes.36 As a result, the Supreme Court of Canada retained jurisdiction of the
matter for nearly a decade, issuing new follow-up judgments about the timing and
extent of the translation process.37
While accountability focuses on supervising the implementation of judicial
remedies, enforcement focuses on mandating the implementation of judicial
remedies and applying penalties for non-compliance. In both cases, the
implementation of the required action (e.g., payment of damages or policy
change) remains squarely within the scope of the legislative and executive branch.
Administrative tribunals are limited to the scope of enforcement power that is
identified in their enabling statute, provided that such power is constitutionally
valid.38 Tribunals often seek enforcement of their orders via court application,
which allows the tribunal to use judicial enforcement mechanisms (e.g., holding
a party in contempt or pursuing quasi-criminal prosecution).39
Enforcing mandatory actions as a remedy against the Crown can be very
challenging for litigants due to the limitations of Crown liability legislation,
regardless of whether the judgment was issued by an administrative tribunal or a
court.40 Parties generally cannot seek injunctive relief or specific performance
against the Crown; the federal Crown Liability and Proceedings Act requires courts to
order declaratory relief against the Crown in lieu of injunctions or specific
performance in an effort to preserve the separation of powers.41 However,
Manitoba Language Rights Reference, supra note 20 at para 152.
Kent Roach & Geoff Budlender, “Mandatory Relief and Supervisory Jurisdiction:
When is it Appropriate, Just and Equitable?” (2005) 122 South African LJ 325 at 340.
See Doucet-Boudreau, supra note 5 for another example of courts acting in a supervisory
function.
38 Ford, supra note 35 at 56.
39 Ibid at 57.
40 In this section, I use the federal Crown Liability and Proceedings Act as an example
(recognizing that provincial Crown liability legislation also exists for actions against the
provincial Crown).
41 Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, RSC 1985, c C-50, s 22(1) [Crown Liability and
Proceedings Act]; Robert Sharpe, Injunctions and specific performance (Toronto: Thomson
Reuters Canada, 2017) (loose-leaf updated 2018, release 27) at para 3.1040.
36
37
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injunctive relief can typically be awarded against Ministers or Crown servants
unlawfully exercising statutory powers.42 The Crown can be held liable for courtordered damages, and if a litigant receives a certificate of judgment against the
Crown, the Minister of Finance is directed to authorize the payment out of the
Consolidated Revenue Fund.43 While the statutory language for the payment of
judgments is a directive on the Minister of Finance, parties cannot execute on the
judgment against the Crown as a judgment creditor if the Crown does not
comply.44 Parties typically cannot hold the Crown itself in contempt, unless the
order was made against an officer or servant of the Crown.45 These limitations
illustrate that while tribunals and courts can hold executive actors accountable, it
can be difficult to enforce for non-compliance.
Behaviour Change

Judicial remedies may also be needed to change individual and institutional
behaviours, guiding how executive power is exercised in the future. In this
section, I draw a distinction between individual and institutional behaviour
change and explore how various remedies might achieve different types of
outcomes. Individual and institutional behaviour change are related concepts;
individuals can shape the culture of their organization through their conduct or
change their behaviour as a result of new policies or practices implemented at the
institutional level. Unfortunately, there is limited research in Canada on how
different types of remedies directly influence behaviour change among public
officials and the institutions in which they operate. Often, this is a question of
attribution—whether we can attribute institutional behaviour change to the

Sharpe, supra note 41 at para 3.1050. The Crown servant’s act must give rise to
personal liability to proceed (Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, supra note 41, s 10).
43 Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, supra note 41 at s 30(1).
44 Ibid at ss 3, 29. See Hughes v Canada (Human Rights Commission), 2019 FC 53 for a recent
discussion of the limitations on executing judgments against the Crown.
45 Peter W Hogg, Patrick J Monahan & Wade K Wright, Liability of the Crown, 4th ed
(Toronto: Thomson Reuters Canada, 2011) at 82-83.
42
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judicial remedy itself, the policy/legislation that results from the judicial decision,
or the implementation efforts of public officials.46
The potential for a judicial remedy to change individual or institutional
behaviour is often influenced by a litigant’s choice of procedure and the nature
of the claim. From a procedural perspective, class action lawsuits (compared to
individual lawsuits) are one of the most established routes for prompting
behaviour change in public law litigation because the remedies are awarded to the
class a whole, forcing governments to internalize the costs of the harm they
created on a larger scale.47 Litigants can also influence behaviour change by
pursuing claims against the Crown with either a procedural or substantive nature.
Behaviour change at a procedural level focuses on changing how public officials
and institutions exercise discretion when administering processes by ensuring
they act reasonably, fairly, and transparently. In contrast, changing behaviour at a
substantive level focuses on ensuring public officials and institutions make
appropriate decisions that are within the scope of their legal authority.
At the individual level, behaviour change is reflected in the behaviour or
conduct of public officials. Unlike private individuals or private firms, public
officials are less likely to respond as rational economic actors with the intent of
maximizing wealth.48 Public officials can also effectively externalize remedial
costs through delay by taking advantage of the short-term nature of electoral
cycles.49 When monetary damages are awarded to plaintiffs, it is taxpayers— not
public officials—who ultimately internalize the cost of wrongdoing.50 When
courts issue decisions or orders, it can be challenging for public officials to
translate that judicial guidance to the level of front-line discretionary decisionmaking.51 Often, judicial guidance is translated into soft law (e.g., policy or
Bradley C Canon & Charles A Johnson, Judicial Policies: Implementation and Impact
(Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 1999) at 190.
47 Craig Jones & Angela Baxter, “The Class Action and Public Authority Liability:
Preferability Re-examined” (2007) 57 UNBLJ 27 at 33.
48 Ibid at 33-34.
49 Ibid at 36.
50 Ibid at 37-38.
51 Lorne Sossin, “The Politics of Soft Law: How Judicial Decisions Influence
Bureaucratic Discretion in Canada” in Marc Hertogh & Simon Halliday, eds, Judicial
46
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procedure manuals) to influence how front-line public officials exercise their
discretion.52 Sossin observed in several Canadian judicial review case studies that
judicial decision-making can have a significant impact on how front-line public
officials exercise their discretion, but that impact occurs “not as quickly, as
comprehensively or as coherently as litigants and the courts would wish.”53
Judicial guidance may also inadvertently instruct frontline officials how to
describe their reasons in a manner that is compliant with the court’s approach to
avoid future judicial review but fails to address the underlying bias or
discrimination that may exist.54
Institutional behaviour change is reflected in the policies and practices of
the organization’s operations, influencing the conduct of individual public
officials. At the institutional level, behaviour change is influenced by several key
factors: (1) policy tensions between the judicial order and the agency’s core
mandate or function; (2) inertia; (3) political factors; and (4) community
pressure.55 Political science professor Bradley Canon noted that the extent of
institutional “behavioural adjustment” that occurs after a judicial decision has
been issued largely depends on the “acceptance decision” of the agency leader —
a psychological reaction that perceives the decision to be positive, negative, or
neutral.56 If the agency’s leader reacts strongly to the judicial decision (positive or
negative), it is more likely that the leader will maximize the institution’s efforts to
implement the decision or minimize their effort to comply.57 In some cases,
remedies that facilitate institutional behaviour change may overlap with systemic
changes, discussed below.
Review and Bureaucratic Impact: International and Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2004) 129 at 130.
52 Ibid at 159.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid at 151.
55 Bradley C Canon, “Studying Bureaucratic Implementation of Judicial Policies in the
United States: Conceptual and Methodological Approaches” in Marc Hertogh & Simon
Halliday, eds, Judicial Review and Bureaucratic Impact: International and Interdisciplinary
Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) 76 at 95-96. While Bradley
Canon’s research focuses on the American perspective, his observations are also
relevant to the Canadian context.
56 Ibid at 80.
57 Ibid at 81.

14
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Systemic Change

Accountability, enforceability, and behaviour change may demonstrate that
a judicial remedy provides meaningful redress for individual plaintiffs or classes
of plaintiffs, but they do not necessarily reflect whether a judicial remedy can
achieve longer-term systemic change. Human rights scholars Gwen Brodsky,
Shelagh Day, and Frances Kelly note some examples of systemic change that
could be achieved through judicial remedies. This includes mandating reporting
requirements as part of a supervisory order, providing training for frontline staff,
or requiring governments to review all relevant legislation within a particular
timeframe to ensure it is human rights compliant.58 While some administrative
bodies have the inherent authority to grant systemic remedies based on their
governing statutes,59 courts often have to address systemic policy/legislative
change more indirectly through judicial review remedies or monetary damages.60
Kent Roach argued that the executive and legislative branches of government are
likely to expedite the process of developing systemic remedies if they are subject
to significant public pressure or the individual remedies awarded by courts are
particularly costly.61
At the administrative tribunal level, the nature of systemic remedies can vary
significantly based on the scope of authority articulated in their enabling
legislation. In many cases, administrative tribunals have a broader mandate than
courts and can leverage a broader range of remedial tools to adjudicate disputes.62
However, in Moore v British Columbia (Education), the Supreme Court of Canada
clarified that while administrative bodies can provide remedies for individual
claimants that have a systemic impact, they cannot award systemic remedies that
are too remote from the scope of the complaint (e.g., ordering specific
Brodsky, Day & Kelly, supra note 8 at 45-46.
See ibid at 29.
60 In individual or class actions, monetary damages may serve to “attract media attention
and the attention of defendant governments” (Lorne Sossin, “Class Actions against the
Crown: A Substitution for Judicial Review on Administrative Law Grounds” (2007) 57
UNBLJ 9 at 16). However, increased attention may not always translate into meaningful
legislative or policy change.
61 Kent Roach, “Dialogic remedies” (2019) 17:3 Int’l J Constitutional L 860 at 873.
62 Ford, supra note 35 at 49.
58
59
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government funding allocations).63 Courts are often more constrained than
administrative tribunals in their remedial discretion and more reticent to award
systemic remedies due to the separation of powers doctrine. Courts are highly
respectful of institutional roles. Remedies that affect budgetary priorities or policy
choices are typically the exception, not the rule.64
The Ontario Human Rights Board of Inquiry decision McKinnon v Ontario
(Correctional Services) demonstrates some of these challenges when enforcing
systemic remedies.65 In McKinnon, the Board of Inquiry held that Mr. McKinnon
experienced discrimination and harassment on the basis of his Aboriginal
ancestry. The Board of Inquiry awarded monetary damages, an order for public
notices, and a human rights training program for staff.66 When the Government
of Ontario employer failed to implement the remedies, additional systemic
remedies were ordered, including training for ministry and facility management
and the appointment of a third-party consultant.67 In 2011, after numerous
decisions and 13 years after the initial Board of Inquiry decision, the Tribunal
argued in the Ontario Divisional Court that the Deputy Minister should be held
in contempt.68 After the settlement, the Ontario Human Rights Commission and
relevant ministries in the Government of Ontario signed a three-year Human
Rights Project with clear mechanisms for accountability.69 McKinnon is an
extraordinary example of the challenges administrative tribunals can face when
seeking to implement systemic remedies.

2012 SCC 61 at paras 57, 63, 64.
Roach, Constitutional remedies, supra note 11 at 3.790.
65 [1998] OHRBID No 10 [1998 McKinnon Decision]. The Ontario Human Rights Board
of Inquiry is now called the Ontario Human Rights Tribunal.
66 Ibid at para 360.
67 McKinnon v Ontario (Correctional Services), [2002] OHRBID No 22 at para 311.
68 McKinnon v Ontario (Correctional Services), 2011 HRTO 263 [2011 McKinnon Decision].
69 Ford, supra note 35 at 54.
63
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IV. CASE STUDIES OF REMEDIES FOR EXECUTIVE
ACTION
It is unlikely that tribunal or court-ordered remedies for executive action will
fulfill all three indicia outlined by Cane and Sunkin. In this section, I develop two
case studies to illustrate the challenges of implementing meaningful remedies in
practice. After discussing the history of the litigation using tribunal/court
decisions and various secondary sources, I evaluate the remedies based on the
three indicia discussed: (1) accountability and enforceability; (2) behaviour change
(both individual and institutional); and (3) systemic change. In Kanthasamy, these
principles are explored in the context of litigation between an individual plaintiff
and administrative executive actors (immigration officers in Citizenship and
Immigration Canada) as a judicial review application. In First Nations Child and
Family Caring Society, these principles are applied to litigation between a class of
plaintiffs and a political executive body (the Minister of Indigenous Services
Canada)70 before a human rights tribunal. Both cases expose important tensions
between courts, tribunals, and the Crown in how judicial remedies are ordered
and enforced.
The legal issues and remedial outcomes in both case studies differ
significantly, but they share several key similarities. Both cases focus on providing
just outcomes and equitable treatment for marginalized children experiencing
discrimination using domestic or international human rights frameworks. Both
cases discuss the human rights principle of “best interests of the child.” First
Nations Child and Family Caring Society does so from a domestic perspective by
focusing on Jordan’s Principle and the majority in Kanthasamy explores the
concept using the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and non-binding
child asylum guidelines from the United Nations High Commissioner for

This name reflects the department’s current name, which has changed numerous
times since the start of the litigation. Throughout this case study, I refer to the
department based on its name at the time the decision was issued.
70
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Refugees.71 Both cases also identify critical flaws in how government systems
(First Nations child welfare and immigration/refugee protection) operate and, in
doing so, shifted public discourse about the role of administrative tribunals and
courts in addressing systemic inequality.
Kanthasamy v Canada (Attorney General)

Kanthasamy v Canada (Attorney General) is a case about the scope of
humanitarian and compassionate (H&C) considerations for children seeking
refugee protection in Canada. At the time of trial, Mr. Kanthasamy was a 16-yearold adolescent from Sri Lanka who was denied refugee protection from
Citizenship and Immigration Canada on the basis that Sri Lankan authorities had
taken steps to address the persecution facing Tamils and Mr. Kanthasamy himself
was not immediately at risk.72 At the time of Mr. Kanthasamy’s refugee protection
application, the Refugee Appeal Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board
was not yet established; therefore, Mr. Kanthasamy was required to apply directly
for judicial review.73 Mr. Kanthasamy’s judicial review application for a
reassessment on H&C grounds was denied on the basis that his return to Sri
Lanka would not result in “hardship that was unusual and undeserved or
disproportionate.”74 However, the Federal Court certified the question of how
the nature of “risk” should be assessed under section 25 of the Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act.75 On appeal, the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed Mr.
Kanthasamy’s appeal and held that the immigration officer’s interpretation of
section 25 was reasonable in the circumstances.76

2016 FNCFCS Decision, supra note 14 at para 346; Kanthasamy, supra note 13 at paras
37-39. See also Dan Moore, “Engagement with Human Rights by Administrative
Decision-Makers: A Transformative Opportunity to Build a More Grassroots Human
Rights Culture” (2017) 49:1 Ottawa L Rev 131 at 147.
72 2013 FC 802 at para 1 [Kanthasamy Trial Decision].
73 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, “Refugee appeals” (15 March 2019),
online: <irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/refugee-appeals/Pages/index.aspx>; Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27, s 72(1).
74 Kanthasamy Trial Decision, supra note 72 at para 3.
75 Ibid at paras 67-74.
76 Kanthasamy v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FCA 113 at para 4 [Kanthasamy
FCA Decision].
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The Supreme Court of Canada heard Mr. Kanthasamy’s case in 2015, finding
the immigration officer’s decision unreasonable.77 Justice Abella, writing for the
majority, held that the immigration officer failed to make a holistic determination
of Mr. Kanthasamy’s H&C grounds by cumulatively assessing the hardship
factors.78 Justice Abella held that immigration officers should not treat the soft
law Ministerial Guidelines as mandatory requirements and the “unusual and
undeserved or disproportionate” hardship requirement as a set of distinct legal
thresholds.79 Immigration officers are also required to consider the “best interests
of the child” principle in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Rights
of the Child.80 The majority set aside the immigration officer’s decision and
remitted the matter back to Citizenship and Immigration Canada for
consideration.81 Unfortunately, Citizenship and Immigration Canada’s postKanthasamy decision is not publicly available and Mr. Kanthasamy’s immigration
status is currently unknown.
Accountability and Enforceability

By remitting the issue back to Citizenship and Immigration Canada for reconsideration, the Supreme Court of Canada opted not to introduce oversight or
enforcement mechanisms as part of their remedy in Kanthasamy. Consistent with
the principles of administrative law, the Supreme Court of Canada deferred to
the authority of the executive actor (immigration officers) to revisit Mr.
Kanthasamy’s case using the common law principles articulated by the Court.
While this principle is based in the separation of powers doctrine, it can create
underwhelming results for plaintiffs if the administrative decision-maker repeats
their actions or fails to account for the judicial direction provided by the Court.82
Unfortunately, without Citizenship and Immigration’s reconsidered decision, it is
difficult to evaluate whether the Board effectively adopted the Supreme Court of
Kanthasamy, supra note 13 at para 61.
Ibid at para 28.
79 Ibid at paras 32, 60.
80 Ibid at paras 34, 37.
81 Kanthasamy, supra note 13 at para 64. If Kanthasamy’s case was reheard by the
Immigration and Refugee Board, the subsequent decision is not publicly available.
82 Forcese et al, supra note 12 at 564.
77
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Canada’s direction for how to interpret the best interests of the child in Mr.
Kanthasamy’s application.
Behaviour Change

Despite the lack of accountability or enforcement mechanisms, Kanthasamy
is an important example of how courts can provide a strong signal—without
being overly prescriptive—that institutional behaviour change is needed. Similar
to Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), the Supreme Court of
Canada in Kanthasamy provided judicial guidance for how to interpret and apply
the Ministry’s non-binding soft law guidelines when exercising discretion, but did
not direct specific amendments to binding legislation or policy.83 In addition to
informing the soft law guidelines, the Supreme Court of Canada also provided a
clear analytical framework for immigration officers to apply when reviewing H&C
decisions that engage the best interests of the child.84 Shortly after the decision
was released, some immigration lawyers described evidence of behavioural
change at the institutional level. This included observations of how Citizenship
and Immigration Canada and the Immigration and Refugee Board dealt with
H&C cases from a procedural perspective, noting that “pending judicial review
applications [were] consented to [and] refused humanitarian applications [were]
re-opened.”85 These institutional changes demonstrate that Kanthasamy may have
had a positive impact on executive action, at least in the short term.
However, post-Kanthasamy the actions of individual immigration officers in
judicial review decisions have not consistently reflected these observations about
institutional behaviour change. In the years following the release of the
Kanthasamy decision, the Federal Court judicially reviewed numerous Citizenship
and Immigration decisions where immigration officers failed to comply with the

See Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 SCR 817.
See Lu v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 175; Cerezo v Canada (Citizenship
and Immigration), 2016 FC 1224; Li v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2016
FC 451.
85 Ron Poulton, “Kanthasamy and the spring cleaning of immigration law” Canadian
Lawyer (2016), online: <www.canadianlawyermag.com/news/opinion/kanthasamy-andthe-spring-cleaning-of-immigration-law/270057>.
83
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best interests of the child framework.86 In several cases, the Federal Court
described the reasons provided by immigration officers as “run[ning] afoul of the
teachings from Kanthasamy”87 or “fail[ing] … to show any compassionate
consideration that goes beyond the strict hardship lens.”88 It may be unreasonable
to expect that the Kanthasamy principles would be adopted and reasonably
considered by immigration officers in all cases. However, the number of recent
decisions that disregard the best interests of children framework indicates that
Kanthasamy may not have resulted in the individual behaviour change that was
intended.
Systemic Change

As a judicial review application, the Federal Court, Federal Court of Appeal,
and Supreme Court of Canada were limited in their ability to impose systemic
remedies. However, Mr. Kanthasamy’s case has indirectly impacted how
immigration officers evaluate H&C grounds and incorporate the best interests of
children when reviewing refugee protection cases. The judicial direction in
Kanthasamy resulted in updated policies for Citizenship and Immigration Canada
when assessing H&C applications. These updates included considering hardship
in the context of H&C applications, applying the H&C threshold of proof,
incorporating best interests of the child, and balancing consistency and
discretion.89 These policy changes are soft law and therefore not legally binding.
See Lopez Cobo v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 349; Babfunmi v Canada
(Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 151; Aguirre Renteria v Canada (Citizenship and
Immigration), 2019 FC 133; Skinner v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 3;
Cojuhari v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 1009 and Dowers v Canada
(Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 889 for a recent sample of IRB decisions that were
remitted back to Citizenship and Immigration Canada for reconsideration for failing to
follow the Supreme Court’s direction in Kanthasamy. To draw a reasonable inference
about behaviour change, I reviewed Federal Court decisions when the immigration
officer’s decisions was issued after the Kanthasamy decision.
87 Skinner v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 3 at para 53.
88 Yanchak v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 117 at para 17.
89 Government of Canada, “Program delivery update – March 2, 2016: update to
guidance on humanitarian and compassionate consideration” (2016), online:
<www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/corporate/publicationsmanuals/operational-bulletins-manuals/updates/2016-03-02.html>.
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Yet, they provide clear direction for immigration officers to change their practices
by approaching H&C discretion with greater flexibility and assessing “hardship”
holistically by using a broad range of non-exhaustive factors.90 However, as noted
previously, subsequent judicial review of Citizenship and Immigration decisions
demonstrated that these policy changes did not always result in behaviour change
for frontline immigration officials.
First Nations Child and Family Caring Society v Canada (Attorney General)

In 2011, the First Nations Child and Family Caring Society (FNCFCS) filed
a complaint at the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal claiming that 54,000 First
Nations children living on-reserve were not receiving adequate child welfare
funding compared to their non-Indigenous counterparts.91 FNCFCS argued that
chronic underfunding resulted in culturally inappropriate service delivery and a
“systemic discriminatory impact” for First Nations children. They requested a
Tribunal order for an annual funding increase of $109 million from Indigenous
and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC) to address the funding shortfall.92 The
Tribunal dismissed the complaint on the basis of an inadequate evidentiary
record, but re-visited the matter after the Federal Court granted three applications
for judicial review and set aside the Tribunal’s decision.93 After numerous
motions about procedural issues and allegations of retaliation directed towards
FNCFCS advocate Dr. Cindy Blackstock, the matter was finally reheard by the
Tribunal in 2013/2014. A decision was rendered in 2016. The Tribunal found
that Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada (AANDC) was
discriminating against First Nations on-reserve children.94 The Tribunal ordered
AANDC to cease its discriminatory practices, reform the child welfare funding
model, and apply the “full meaning and scope” of Jordan’s Principle, according

Judith Boer, “H&C Update Following the SCC Kanthasamy Decision” Continuing
Legal Education Society of British Columbia (2016), online: </www.cle.bc.ca/practicepoint/human-rights/hc-update-following-scc-kanthasamy-decision> at 4.1.3.
91 2011 CHRT 4 at para 21 [2011 FNCFCS Decision].
92 Ibid at para 21.
93 First Nations Child and Family Caring Society of Canada et al v Canada (Attorney General),
2012 CHRT 16 at para 4.
94 2016 FNCFCS Decision, supra note 14 at para 466.
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to which First Nations children are supposed to be able to access the social,
health, educational, and other services they need in a timely manner.95
Disappointingly, this case was not resolved by the orders outlined in the
2016 decision and the Tribunal continues to maintain its jurisdiction over the
matter. The Tribunal issued subsequent orders directing AANDC in its
implementation of Jordan’s Principle96 and heard new motions from FNCFCS
alleging AANDC’s non-compliance with the remedial orders.97 In its noncompliance decision, the Tribunal noted that it is “not interested in drafting
policies, choosing between policies, supervising policy-drafting or unnecessarily
embarking on the specifics of reform.”98 The Tribunal then ordered additional
remedies to the 2016 decision, requiring AANDC to conduct needs assessments
with First Nations agencies, develop alternative funding systems (in recognition
that longer-term funding reform was underway), and evaluate its progress (with
specific timelines for reporting back to the Tribunal).99 The Tribunal has since
issued decisions providing guidance to AANDC on how to define “essential
service,” “service gap,” “unreasonable delay” and the category of First Nations
children eligible for coverage under Jordan’s Principle and how to implement the
compensation framework.100
To enforce the remedies, the Tribunal indicated that it may be required to
maintain jurisdiction (similar to McKinnon) to facilitate meaningful
implementation.101 In 2019, the Tribunal issued another decision following up on
the parties’ submissions about compensation. The 2019 decision ordered $20,000
(plus interest) payable to each First Nations child and to each First Nations parent
or grandparent of children that were removed from their home between January
1, 2006 and the earliest of when the discrimination has ceased, the date the parties

Ibid at para 481.
See 2016 CHRT 10, 2017 CHRT 14 and 2017 CHRT 35.
97 2018 FNCFCS Decision, supra note 1.
98 Ibid at para 48.
99 Ibid at paras 407-450.
100 See 2020 FNCFCS Decision, supra note 4; 2020 CHRT 15; 2020 CHRT 20; 2020
CHRT 36; 2021 CHRT 6; 2021 CHRT 7.
101 2018 FNCFCS Decision, supra note 1 at para 388.
95
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settle the agreement, or the date the Tribunal ceases to retain jurisdiction.102 The
Attorney General of Canada filed an application for judicial review with the
Federal Court and requested a stay of the Tribunal’s compensation ruling.103 The
Federal Court denied the Attorney General’s application for a stay and denied the
FNCFCS’s motion to stay the Attorney General’s judicial review. The decision
concluded that the possibility of a future judicial review may incentivize the
parties to negotiate and expedite their discussions.104
Accountability and Enforceability

The protracted First Nations Child and Family Caring Society case has clearly
tested the boundaries of the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal’s remedial
jurisdiction—particularly on issues of accountability and enforceability. In its
2018 FNCFCS decision, the Tribunal stated that “the rule of law is directly
dependent on the ability of the Tribunal to enforce its process and maintain
respect for remedial orders otherwise the CHRA is meaningless as a tool to
eliminate discrimination.”105 The 2019 FNCFCS decision was the Tribunal’s
eighth non-compliance order, and enforcement issues have continued as the
Attorney General of Canada maintains that the decisions should be quashed.106
The Tribunal has expressed concern that the Attorney General has opted for noncompliance, noting that “no party can unilaterally elect to simply not-comply with

2019 FNCFCS Decision, supra note 4 at paras 245, 275. The Tribunal rejected the
argument that compensation should not be awarded on the basis that First Nations
children may also receive monetary damages through a certified class action in Federal
Court or a claim for Charter damages (para 205).
103 Canada (Attorney General) v First Nations Child and Family Caring Society (2019),
Application for Judicial Review, online:
<fncaringsociety.com/sites/default/files/federal_court_document_t-1621-19.pdf>
[2019 AG Application for Judicial Review] (the application has been ordered into case
management).
104 Canada (Attorney General) v First Nations Child and Family Caring Society of Canada, 2019
FC 1529 at paras 32-33 [2019 FNCFCS FC Decision].
105 2018 FNCFCS Decision, supra note 1 at para 89.
106 2019 AG Application for Judicial Review, supra note 103.
102
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Tribunal orders.”107 The judicial review was heard in Federal Court from June 1418, 2021.108
The CHRT has not yet exercised the full extent of its statutory enforcement
powers in this case. Under section 57 of the Canadian Human Rights Act (CHRA),
the Tribunal can file an order with the Federal Court to apply court enforcement
remedies.109 The CHRA allows the Tribunal itself to engage the Federal Court’s
enforcement powers to hold parties in contempt for failing to comply.110
However, contempt is not available when the non-complying party is the Crown
as an executive body (e.g., a ministry or department).111 As was the case in
McKinnon, in certain cases it may be possible to attribute institutional
responsibility to senior public officials, such as Deputy Ministers, if their actions
were contemptuous in nature (e.g., withholding documents).112 If the Attorney
General’s application for judicial review is unsuccessful, the Tribunal may be able
to exercise its remedial discretion (similar to McKinnon) to request the Federal
Court hold senior public officials in contempt for their non-compliance.113
Behaviour Change

On November 25, 2019, the Attorney General of Canada and the Minister
of Indigenous Services made an unexpected announcement: the Government of
Canada was committed to “seeking a comprehensive settlement on

Letter from Judy Dubois, Registry Officer, Canadian Human Rights Tribunal (27
November 2019), online (pdf):
<fncaringsociety.com/sites/default/files/2019.11.27._lt_fc_registry_chrt_deadline_exte
nsion.pdf>.
108 Brett Forester, “Feds submit arguments to overturn ‘unreasonable’ and ‘egregious’
CHRT rulings” APTN (12 March 2021), online: <www.aptnnews.ca/nationalnews/feds-argue-discrimination-not-ongoing-chrt>.
109 Canadian Human Rights Act, RSC 1985, c H-6, s 57.
110 Warman v Tremaine, 2011 FCA 297 at para 44; Federal Court Rules, SOR/98-106, ss
424(1), 425.
111 Hogg, Monahan & Wright, supra note 45 at 82-83; 2011 McKinnon Decision, supra
note 68 at para 64.
112 2011 McKinnon Decision, supra note 68 at para 168.
113 Ibid at para 186.
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compensation” for the underfunding of child welfare services on-reserve.114
While the announcement cited the advocacy efforts of the FNCFCS and the
CHRT decisions, the impetus was another legal proceeding: a six billion dollar
class action for First Nations children affected by the on-reserve child welfare
system between 1991–2019 with two lead plaintiffs, Jeremy Meawasige and
Xavier Moushoom.115 Meawasige is a representative of the Jordan’s Principle class
in the proceeding, after the Government of Canada denied funding for him to
receive treatment for cerebral palsy, spinal curvature, and autism in Pictou
Landing First Nation in Nova Scotia. Moushoom is advancing the class action
based on his experience living in 14 foster homes between the ages of 9–18. If
the class action results in a settlement, the two proceedings would not be mutually
exclusive: First Nations children affected by the on-reserve child welfare system
could seek compensation from both the CHRT proceeding and the class action
settlement.116 Shortly thereafter, the Assembly of First Nations also commenced
a class action lawsuit seeking $10B in damages on behalf of First Nations children
impacted by Jordan’s Principle.117 Both Meawasige and Moushoom’s class action
and the Assembly of First Nations class action have been certified by the Federal
Court.
The behaviour change outcomes between the class actions and the CHRT
decisions are markedly different. The scope of the class actions is also broader
Indigenous Services Canada, News Release, “Joint Statement by the Minister of
Indigenous Services and the Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada on
compensation for First Nations children” (25 November 2019), online:
<www.canada.ca/en/indigenous-services-canada/news/2019/11/joint-statement-bythe-minister-of-indigenous-services-and-the-minister-of-justice-and-attorney-general-ofcanada-on-compensation-for-first-nations.html>.
115 Jorge Barrera, “Ottawa in talks to settle First Nations child welfare class action
lawsuit” CBC News (4 November 2019), online:
<www.cbc.ca/news/indigenous/challenge-child-welfare-lawsuit-1.5343818> [Barrera,
“Ottawa in talks”].
116 Ibid.
117 Assembly of First Nations, “AFN National Chief Bellegarde welcomes Canada’s
consent to certification of national class action involving First Nations child and family
services, and agreement to proceed to mediation” (3 September 2020), online:
<www.afn.ca/afn-national-chief-bellegarde-welcomes-canadas-consent-to-certificationof-national-class-action-involving-first-nations-child-and-family-services-andagreement-to-proceed-to-mediation>.
114
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than the human rights complaint, with the potential to compensate First Nations
children affected from 1991 onwards (compared to the Tribunal’s compensation
order, from 2006 onwards).118 The Government of Canada emphasized that the
CHRT compensation order “does not properly address all issues around
appropriate compensation”119 and the $40,000 block compensation regardless of
the recipient’s circumstances could result in unfairness.120 Canon’s framework
provides two possible explanations for why institutional behaviour change has
occurred faster in the class actions: (1) political factors; and (2) community
pressure.121 Underfunding on-reserve child welfare became a 2019 federal
election issue, and the Liberal government faced extensive criticism for its failure
to comply with the CHRT’s order.122 The Liberal government also received
significant criticism from various Indigenous stakeholders about its failure to
comply with the CHRT’s order.123 It is possible that community pressure reached
a “tipping point” and the Minister of Justice preferred a politically opportune
private settlement process over public litigation.
Systemic Change

In its 2019 decision, the Tribunal emphasized that the evidence supported
individual remedies (compensation for children and their families) and systemic
remedies (policy and funding formula changes), both of which fall within the
Tribunal’s remedial jurisdiction under the CHRA.124 On the underlying remedial
objective, the Tribunal noted that this case was about “justice” and “real and
measurable change.”125
Real and measurable change can only be achieved if the CHRT can
successfully “grant remedial orders that can be an effective counter to the full
Ibid.
Indigenous Services Canada, supra note 114.
120 Barrera, “Ottawa in talks”, supra note 115.
121 Canon, supra note 55 at 95-96.
122 Teresa Wright, “Trudeau government appeals ruling on compensation to First
Nations children” Global News (4 October 2019), online:
<globalnews.ca/news/5991248/appeal-indigenous-children-welfare>.
123 Ibid.
124 FNCFCS 2019 Decision, supra note 4 at para 13.
125 2018 FNCFCS Decision, supra note 1 at para 451 [emphasis original].
118
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extent of the proven discrimination, and penetrate known institutional barriers to
change.”126 While the Attorney General has signalled the desire to implement the
systemic orders and change Canada’s child welfare funding formulas,127 the act of
filing for judicial review over the issue of monetary compensation—after almost
a decade of protracted litigation—appears hypocritical and contrary to the
Government of Canada’s commitment to reconciliation.128
In the 2016 FNCFCS decision, the Tribunal ordered AANDC to reform the
First Nations Child & Family Services Program and 1965 Agreement (a costsharing agreement between the Government of Ontario and Government of
Canada), cease applying discriminatory funding formulas for First Nations child
welfare, and apply the full meaning and scope of Jordan’s Principle.129 Indigenous
Services Canada cited several key policy developments as evidence of systemic
changes that complied with the CHRT decisions: reforms to on-reserve child
welfare funding principles, the introduction of Bill C-92 to reform the
administration of First Nations child welfare, and a more liberal interpretation of
Jordan’s Principle (resulting in the fulfillment of 478,000 requests for funding for
products, services, and supports).130 Indigenous Services Canada has also changed
the funding formula, allowing First Nations child and family service agencies to
bill Indigenous Services Canada at actual cost, both for future service delivery and
retroactively back to January 26, 2016.131 Modernizing the 1965 Agreement has

Brodsky, Day & Kelly, supra note 8 at 4.
2018 FNCFCS Decision, supra note 1 at para 449.
128 Olivia Stefanovich, “Trudeau government seeks judicial review of tribunal decision
to compensate First Nations kids”, CBC News (2019), online:
<www.cbc.ca/news/politics/human-rights-tribunal-liberal-child-welfare-appeal1.5308897>.
129 2016 FNCFCS Decision, supra note 14 at para 481.
130 Indigenous Services Canada, supra note 114; Indigenous and Northern Affairs
Canada, “Contributions to provide women, children and families with protection and
prevention services” (1 April 2019), online: <www.aadncaandc.gc.ca/eng/1386520802043/1386520921574>.
131 First Nations Child and Family Caring Society, “First Nations Child and Family
Service Agency Funding Changes per the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal” (2 January
2019), online:
<fncaringsociety.com/sites/default/files/fncfsa_funding_changes_0.pdf>.
126
127
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required extensive federal-provincial negotiations, and appears to remain an
ongoing initiative for Indigenous Services Canada.132

V. DISCUSSION & IMPLICATIONS
These case studies provide three key observations about how Crown
executive actors respond to tribunal or court-ordered remedies: (1) they are
largely distrusting of remedies ordered by administrative tribunals; (2) they are
often motivated by political opportunism; and (3) they often opt to introduce
systemic changes through soft law rather than legally binding measures. These
observations are not intended to reflect universal truths in public law litigation;
undoubtedly, there are numerous examples of court-ordered remedies achieving
meaningful change for Crown executive actors and other affected parties. Instead,
these observations about two specific case studies provide a starting point to
explore the issue of remedies in public law litigation further.
While the Kanthasamy decision was not heard before an administrative
tribunal prior to its judicial review application, the Attorney General’s conduct
throughout the First Nations Child and Family Caring Society proceedings has
demonstrated significant distrust. In the Federal Court hearing to stay the
CHRT’s compensation ruling, Department of Justice lawyer Robert Frater argued
that the CHRT compensation ruling was an “unnecessarily invasive piece of
surgery by the wrong doctors.”133 In the CHRT compensation hearing, the
Attorney General vigorously argued that individual compensation orders were
out of the scope of the CHRT’s remedial jurisdiction for an issue of systemic
discrimination.134 The CHRT found the Attorney General’s consistent failure to
comply with the Tribunal’s previous orders to be wilful and reckless, as public
Jorge Barrera, “50-year-old Ontario First Nation child welfare agreement blamed for
Sixties Scoop under review” CBC News (1 February 2018), online:
<www.cbc.ca/news/indigenous/child-welfare-agreement-ontario-first-nations-underreview-1.4515321>.
133 The Canadian Press, “First Nations child welfare advocate accuses feds of ‘shopping
around’ courts” CTV News (26 November 2019), online:
<www.ctvnews.ca/politics/first-nations-child-welfare-advocate-accuses-feds-ofshopping-around-courts-1.4703078>.
134 2019 FNCFCS Decision, supra note 4 at paras 50-52.
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officials continued to act with full awareness of the adverse consequences for
First Nations children and their families.135 The Attorney General’s relentless
non-compliance with the CHRT’s previous enforcement orders reflects a culture
of distrust and a reluctance to defer to the Tribunal’s authority.
In these cases, political opportunism also has a significant influence on how
executive actors responded to court and tribunal-ordered remedies. The
Kanthasamy decision was issued shortly after the Liberal majority government took
office in 2015. At the time, the government’s stance on immigration signalled a
significant shift in Canada’s immigration policy by committing to accept 25,000
Syrian refugees.136 The photograph of the deceased 3-year-old Turkish refugee
child Alan Kurdi also had a significant galvanizing effect on Canadian officials to
respond to the worldwide refugee crisis, with a particular emphasis on expediting
files for child asylum seekers.137 While Citizenship and Immigration Canada’s soft
law changes were not directly attributed to this policy announcement, it may have
been politically convenient for Citizenship and Immigration Canada to apply a
more “compassionate” interpretation of H&C factors in their review of asylum
applications at this time. Similarly, in First Nations Child and Family Caring Society
the Government of Canada opted to issue a public statement about compensating
First Nations children affected by on-reserve child welfare after the issue became
highly politicized in the 2019 federal election.
The executive actors in these cases also favoured soft law as a remedial
measure, potentially due to its lack of legally binding authority. In Kanthasamy, the
soft law policy changes introduced by Citizenship and Immigration Canada did
not impose any new legal requirements on immigration officers under the
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act or Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations
(e.g., codifying the best interests of the child principle in statute). Since
Ibid at paras 234-35.
CBC News, “Justin Trudeau’s promise to take 25,000 Syrian refugees this year
‘problematic’” CBC News (28 October 2015), online:
<www.cbc.ca/news/politics/trudeau-syria-refugees-settlement-groups-1.3291959>.
137 Ian Austen, “Aylan Kurdi’s Death Resonates in Canadian Election Campaign” New
York Times (3 September 2015), online:
<www.nytimes.com/2015/09/04/world/americas/aylan-kurdis-death-raises-resonatesin-canadian-election-campaign.html>.
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Citizenship and Immigration Canada kept the best interests of the child principle
wholly discretionary for immigration officers, the principle is repeatedly relitigated in the Federal Court. In First Nations Child and Family Caring Society, the
only legally binding remedial measure was the introduction of Bill C-92. However,
Bill C-92 does not contain any legally binding commitments and “provides little
protection for the hard-won gains at the CHRT nor does it include Jordan’s
Principle.”138

VI. CONCLUSION
Former Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin once observed that “a right, no
matter how expansive in theory, is only as meaningful as the remedy provided for
its breach.”139 The case studies of Kanthasamy and First Nations Child and Family
Caring Society provide two examples of underwhelming outcomes in public law
litigation for executive action where the remedies were unenforceable or offered
limited recourse. By quashing the immigration officer’s decision and providing
guidance for the interpretation and application of ministerial guidelines in
Kanthasamy, the Supreme Court of Canada created significant, substantial policy
changes in immigration law. However, there appear to be ongoing challenges with
individual behaviour change to ensure that immigration officers comply with the
best interests of the child principle. In First Nations Child and Family Caring Society,
the CHRT faced significant challenges enforcing individual and systemic orders
against Indigenous Services Canada. The litigation at the CHRT and Federal
Court has spanned nearly a decade, and the CHRT continues to oversee the two
billion dollar compensation order for 54,000 First Nations children affected by
the decision. In contrast, the six billion dollar class action lawsuit launched by
Meawasige and Moushoom in 2019 has already secured a public commitment
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from the Government of Canada to participate in settlement proceedings to
compensate a larger class of First Nations children.140
These observations underscore the importance of strategic litigation when
parties sue the Crown for executive action, recognizing that the remedial
outcomes can be incremental at best. The litigants’ choice of decision-making
body, plaintiff, procedure, and legal issue can significantly impact the scope of
available remedies and the timeliness of the relief. While administrative tribunals
typically have a broader scope of systemic remedies available to them, the First
Nations Child and Family Caring Society litigation has demonstrated that the
enforcement of those remedies—particularly if they are politically contested—
can be a challenging time and resource-intensive process. This paper has provided
a preliminary framework to evaluate remedies against the Crown for executive
action, but in the absence of further empirical research it is difficult to make more
substantive claims about the most effective strategies for Canadian public law
litigation. It would be beneficial for future research to trace the implementation
and enforcement of tribunal and court-ordered remedies over a longer period of
time and identify additional variables that influence whether meaningful social
change is achieved.
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